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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard and Karen Shook, husband and wife, filed suit 
against Avaya, Inc., Richard‟s former employer, alleging a 
violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and 1132.  The Shooks 
contended that Avaya breached its fiduciary duty owed to 
them as participant and beneficiary under the Avaya Pension 
Plan through a series of misleading letters regarding 
Richard‟s pension benefits.  Based on Avaya‟s representation 
of the length of Richard‟s service, the Shooks alleged that 
Richard calculated his expected pension benefit and the 
couple decided that Karen should retire from her job at a 
different company.  The District Court granted Avaya‟s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that Avaya did not 
 3 
make a material misrepresentation.  For the reasons stated 
herein, we will affirm the decision of the District Court on 
partly different grounds.  Specifically, we hold that the 
Shooks‟ decision that Karen should retire is insufficient 
detrimental reliance to establish a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 
I. 
 Richard Shook was employed by Avaya and its 
predecessor companies, including Western Electric and Octel 
Communications Corporation.  Lucent Technologies 
purchased Octel in 1997.  At that point, Avaya was a 
telecommunications unit of Lucent.  Lucent and Octel 
subsequently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
that addressed the integration of the two companies and the 
effect of prior service in determining pension benefits.  
Pursuant to this agreement, Octel service prior to September 
1, 1998 “shall count toward eligibility under the Pension 
Plan,” but that “[f]or pension calculation purposes, a . . . 
pension service date shall be no earlier than September 1, 
1998.”  (App. at 421.)  On October 1, 2000, Avaya became an 
independent company.  As a result, Avaya assumed control of 
the Lucent Pension Plan, of which Richard was a participant.  
Although Richard did not designate Karen as a beneficiary, 
the Avaya Pension Plan provides that pension benefits are 
paid to a lawful spouse if the participant and spouse are 
married when pension payments begin.  (Id. at 327.) 
 The Avaya Pension Plan states that the Recognition of 
Prior Service (“RPS”) date is the employee‟s starting date and 
includes prior service with predecessor companies.  For 
 4 
purposes of pension calculations, an employee‟s monthly 
benefit is calculated by multiplying the applicable pension 
range by the employee‟s net credited service.  (Id. at 314.)  
Net credited service (“NCS”) is defined as the “continuous 
number of years, months and days you have worked for a 
participating company or any other controlled group 
company, beginning with your most recent date of hire and 
ending with your retirement or other termination of 
employment.”  (Id.) 
 On October 18, 1999, the Lucent Technologies 
Pension Service Center sent Richard a letter stating that 
because “Octel is not a participant in the Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. Management Pension Plan (LTMPP), your 
Octel service will not be included in your Net Credited 
Service date.  Accordingly, your Net Credited Service date 
will be 9/1/98.”  (Id. at 367.) 
 In response to Avaya‟s correspondence, Richard filed 
a grievance with Avaya in February 2000 contending that his 
RPS date was calculated improperly and that the mistake 
detrimentally affected his eligibility for benefits.  
Subsequently, on April 7, 2000, the Lucent Technologies 
Pension Service Center sent Richard a follow up letter 
regarding his RPS date.  The letter noted that there was 
confusion regarding when prior service would be recognized 
for purposes of vacation and benefits.  As such, the letter 
clarified that Richard‟s RPS date was October 30, 1980 and 
his NCS date was December 19, 1988.  The letter further 
explained that “your NCS date will remain the same until you 
complete three years of continuous employment with Lucent 
from the Acquisition Date.  At that time, your NCS date will 
 5 
be adjusted to reflect your previous employment with 
Lucent.”  (Id. at 372.)  The letter concluded that Richard‟s 
“supervisor will need the above-referenced information to 
determine [] eligibility for vacation and benefits under the 
Lucent Technologies Inc. Sickness and Accident Disability 
Benefit Plan.”  (Id.) 
 Richard then received another letter from the Lucent 
Pension Service Center on November 21, 2000 stating that his 
NCS date “has been established and updated in the Payroll 
and Personnel Systems.”  (Id. at 373.)  The letter provided 
that Richard‟s “Adjusted NCS Date” was October 30, 1980.  
Like the April 7, 2000 letter, this letter provided that 
Richard‟s supervisor would need the document for purposes 
of disability and vacation benefits. 
 The Shooks contend that, based on the November 2000 
letter, Richard calculated his expected monthly pension using 
the October 30, 1980 NCS date.  Richard believed that he had 
twenty-three years of service that would be credited towards 
his pension.  As a result, he thought he would be able to retire 
in 2005 with twenty-five years of service and receive a full 
pension.  Richard was a member of the Communication 
Workers of America and spoke to his union representative 
regarding possible layoffs at the company.  He also talked to 
co-workers about his estimates.  Richard did not, however, 
confirm this calculation with anyone at Avaya.  In late 2003, 
the Shooks alleged that they jointly made the decision that 
Karen would retire from her job at Verizon, based on their 
current combined income, the likelihood of layoffs at Avaya, 
and Richard‟s expected pension benefit. 
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 After Karen retired, Richard learned he was going to 
be laid off and requested a pension calculation from Avaya.  
On December 14, 2004, Richard received a Pension Plan 
Worksheet calculating Richard‟s monthly benefit to be 
$1,469.25 based on twenty-four years and four months of 
service.  On December 27, 2004, Avaya sent Richard a new 
Pension Plan Worksheet correcting its prior calculation and 
stating that his monthly benefit would be $880.54 based on 
fourteen years and seven months of service.  Richard admits 
that he took no action based on these calculations during this 
thirteen day period.  Richard was laid off from Avaya in 
January 2005.  Richard unsuccessfully appealed the pension 
benefit calculation through Avaya‟s administrative 
procedures. 
 On August 16, 2007, the Shooks filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania against Avaya, asserting claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and 1132 and 
promissory estoppel.
1
  Both parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The District Court granted Avaya‟s 
motion on September 16, 2009. 
 The District Court determined that the Shooks could 
not establish a breach of fiduciary duty claim because Avaya 
had not made a material misrepresentation regarding its 
pension plan.  In its ruling, the District Court found that 
Avaya made no affirmative misrepresentation in the 
                                                 
1
 The District Court granted Avaya‟s motion to dismiss 
the promissory estoppel claim as preempted by ERISA.  The 
Shooks do not appeal this ruling. 
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correspondence prior to Karen‟s retirement in 2003.  The 
District Court concluded that the Memorandum of 
Understanding made clear that an employee‟s pension service 
date would be no earlier than September 1, 1998.  Further, the 
District Court determined, the letters dated October 18, 1999, 
April 7, 2000, and November 21, 2000, provided that 
Richard‟s NCS date was October 30, 1980, for the purpose of 
vacation and disability benefits only.  In addition, the District 
Court noted that Richard did not rely on the mistake in 
calculating his pension benefit from the December 2004 
worksheets because Karen had already retired by that time.  
Finally, the District Court concluded that even if there was a 
misrepresentation, it was not material to Karen‟s retirement.  
The District Court pointed out that the retirement decision did 
not affect Richard‟s benefits or employment.  The District 
Court did not specifically address the element of detrimental 
reliance. 
 The Shooks timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “Our standard of review applicable to an order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 
564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations 
omitted).  In exercising this review, “[w]e may affirm the 
order when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, with the facts viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.”  Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We may affirm the 
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order of the District Court on any grounds supported by the 
record.  Kossler, 564 F.3d at 186.  Additionally, “[t]o the 
extent that the District Court made conclusions of law, our 
review is de novo.”  In re Merck & Co., Inc., Sec., Derivative 
& ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 The Shooks appeal the District Court‟s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Avaya.  Specifically, the 
Shooks argue that the District Court erred in ruling as a 
matter of law that the November 2000 letter was not a 
material misrepresentation and that the Shooks could not have 
reasonably relied on the letter in making the decision about 
Karen‟s retirement.  Avaya counters that the District Court 
properly determined that the correspondence was not a 
material misrepresentation and that the Shooks‟ reliance was 
neither foreseeable nor reasonable. 
 ERISA § 404 provides: 
“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries and – 
 (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to 
participants and their 
beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses 
of administering the plan; 
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 (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of like 
character and with like aims[.]” 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  Pursuant to this provision, we have 
determined that a “fiduciary may not, in the performance of 
[its] duties, „materially mislead those to whom the duties of 
loyalty and prudence are owed.‟”  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree 
Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 579 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(Unisys IV) (quoting Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 
F.3d 475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000)) (additional citation omitted).
2
 
 In order to prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
under ERISA, a plaintiff must establish that:  “(1) the 
defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity; (2) the 
defendant made affirmative misrepresentations or failed to 
adequately inform plan participants and beneficiaries; (3) the 
misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure was material; and 
(4) the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation 
                                                 
2
 We will refer to the sequence of Unisys cases 
accordingly: In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA 
Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995) (Unisys I); In re Unisys 
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 57 F.3d 1255 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (Unisys II); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. 
Benefit ERISA Litig., 242 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2001) (Unisys 
III); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 
579 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2009) (Unisys IV). 
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or inadequate disclosure.”  Unisys IV, 579 F.3d at 228 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Because we hold that the 
decision for Karen to retire does not constitute the type of 
detrimental reliance necessary to establish a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim, we do not address whether the 
previously described correspondence amounts to a material 
misrepresentation.
3
 
 A plaintiff must be either a participant or a beneficiary 
of a plan to bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  Under ERISA, a beneficiary is “a 
person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an 
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a 
benefit thereunder.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).  Richard is a 
participant in the Avaya Pension Plan.  For Karen to recover, 
she must be a beneficiary.  The Shooks assert that Karen is a 
beneficiary because even though Richard did not specifically 
name her as such, the terms of the Avaya Pension Plan 
designated her a beneficiary as Richard‟s spouse.  We find it 
unnecessary to determine whether Karen is a beneficiary 
because, regardless of her status, the particular type of injury 
in this case is insufficient to give rise to a claim for 
detrimental reliance. 
 We have not addressed the precise question of whether 
the element of detrimental reliance is met when the alleged 
injury concerns a non-employee‟s retirement, as opposed to 
an employee‟s retirement or benefits under a plan.  
Detrimental reliance encompasses both an injury and 
                                                 
3
 Avaya never disputed its status as an ERISA 
fiduciary; therefore, this element is not in issue. 
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reasonableness.  See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits 
ERISA Litig., 242 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 2001) (Unisys III); 
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 237 
(3d Cir. 1994).  In demonstrating sufficient reliance, the 
plaintiff must have taken some action as a result of the 
misrepresentation; the mere expectation of a continued 
benefit is not enough.  See, e.g., Hooven v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2006); Burstein v. Ret. 
Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. and 
Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 386 (3d Cir. 2003); Adams v. 
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 493 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 
F.3d 1292, 1302 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 We noted in Unisys III that reliance need not be based 
solely on the employee‟s retirement decision.  242 F.3d at 
508.  In fact, we subsequently determined that a plaintiff‟s 
detrimental reliance “may encompass decisions to decline 
other employment opportunities, to forego the opportunity to 
purchase supplemental health insurance, or other important 
financial decisions pertaining to retirement.”  Unisys IV., 579 
F.3d at 229.  The Shooks contend that based on Avaya‟s 
misrepresentation of Richard‟s NCS date, Richard calculated 
his expected pension benefit and the couple made the joint 
decision that Karen should retire from her position at 
Verizon.  The Shooks urge us to find that this choice is an 
“important financial decision pertaining to retirement” as 
mentioned in Unisys IV.  We decline to do so. 
 In prior decisions where we have found detrimental 
reliance in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the 
common thread has been that the alleged misrepresentation 
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caused an employee participant or beneficiary to make a 
decision regarding benefits or retirement that is related to the 
employee’s plan.  See, e.g., id. at 232-33 (holding employees 
demonstrated detrimental reliance where misrepresentation 
caused them to make decisions regarding their retiree medical 
benefits under plan); Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 263 
F.3d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding widow beneficiary could 
make claim based on misrepresentation causing employee 
husband to decline supplemental insurance under plan); 
Curcio, 33 F.3d at 237 (holding widow beneficiary satisfied 
detrimental reliance element where she and employee 
husband refused supplemental insurance under plan due to 
misrepresentation); Bixler, 12 F.3d at 75 (determining that 
widow beneficiary could bring breach of fiduciary duty claim 
because of misrepresentation regarding her ability to obtain 
COBRA benefits under husband employee‟s benefit plan). 
 We have never held that a decision, whether by a 
participant or beneficiary, that affects a non-employee‟s 
benefits or retirement – separate and apart from the plan – is 
the type of injury for which a fiduciary should be responsible.  
Although the District Court did not specifically address 
detrimental reliance, it was likewise concerned with 
expanding a breach of fiduciary duty claim to encompass this 
type of injury.  In its decision, the District Court expressed its 
hesitation to expand the “materiality” element to include a 
decision like Karen‟s retirement when she was neither an 
employee nor a participant in the plan.  The District Court 
noted that no decision from our Court had ever found a 
misrepresentation to be material to this type of decision, or 
sanctioned this type of detrimental reliance in a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  The District Court ultimately based its 
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conclusion on the fact that Richard did not make any decision 
regarding his benefits or retirement as a result of the alleged 
misrepresentation of his NCS date. 
 We agree with the conclusion of the District Court in 
this regard.  Although the Shooks may have acted based on 
the letters – they determined that Karen should retire – this 
decision did not implicate Richard‟s or Karen‟s benefits 
under the Avaya Pension Plan.  Specifically, Karen‟s 
retirement did not have an effect on Richard‟s pension, his 
benefits, or his retirement.  Avaya‟s communications as to 
Richard‟s NCS date did not prompt Richard to change or 
forego benefits, or to retire.  Additionally, Richard admitted 
that he took no action based on Avaya‟s initial miscalculation 
of his expected pension benefit in the December 14, 2004 
Pension Plan Worksheet.  Likewise, this choice did not 
impact Karen‟s potential benefits under the plan as a 
beneficiary.  Her retirement from Verizon did not alter the 
amount she could potentially receive from Richard‟s pension.  
This type of reliance is simply too attenuated to hold Avaya 
liable as a fiduciary. 
 Moreover, we find that this type of injury is not 
foreseeable and therefore insufficient to establish detrimental 
reliance.  We cautioned in Unisys III that “[a]n employer, 
even when acting in a fiduciary capacity, is not responsible 
for harm that is not reasonably foreseeable.”  242 F.3d at 508.  
Here, Richard did not confirm his calculations of his expected 
pension benefit with any Avaya representative prior to 
Karen‟s retirement.  We do not think it is reasonably 
foreseeable for a fiduciary to anticipate that a non-employee 
would retire based on representations to an employee of his 
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expected pension benefit.  Accordingly, Avaya cannot be held 
liable for conduct that did not implicate its fiduciary 
responsibilities under the Avaya Pension Plan and of which it 
did not otherwise have knowledge. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court, on partly different grounds.  We find that 
neither Richard as a participant nor Karen as a beneficiary 
can establish a breach of fiduciary duty claim when the 
alleged reliance stems from the decision that Karen, a non-
employee, should retire. 
